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introduction
REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation) is typically portrayed 
as a quick and cost-effective means to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions. This is to be achieved 
through transfer payment schemes that com-
pensate agents for refraining from deforestation 
and forest degradation. REDD readiness activi-
ties establish the basis for the implementation 
of such schemes. Readiness activities include 
reforms of forest legislation and land tenure, 
clarification of different actors’ roles and re-
sponsibilities, establishment of carbon stock 
monitoring schemes as well as capacity building 
and awareness-raising. They are generally as-
sumed to be implemented quickly, typically over 
a five year period. 
Based on a detailed case study of the causes of 
deforestation and forest degradation in Ghana, 
we question whether REDD will be that fast and 
easy. The study focuses on the High Forest Zone, 
Why REDD will be neither fast, nor easy:  
The example of Ghana 
p
H
o
T
o
: jE
n
s
 FR
iis
 lu
n
D
paGE 2 pol icy BR iEF  no.  8    novEmBER 2009 ·
Multiple factors cause deforestation and forest degradation in Ghana. Yet, those targetable 
under REDD readiness activities are largely forest governance related and include: low forest 
fees, biased allocation of timber rights, a log export ban and biased sharing of timber re­
venues as well as low enforcement of harvesting rules and rules protecting farmers’ rights. 
The governance factors that promote deforestation and forest degradation also favour the 
political and administrative elite. Consequently, deforestation and forest degradation is 
hardly caused by lack of information, ignorance or low capacity. 
To be effective, REDD reforms in Ghana will challenge elite interests. Accordingly, the imple­
mentation of such reforms will be neither fast, nor easy.   
Countries sharing key characteristics with Ghana, notably a highly centralised forest govern­
ance regime, are likely to face similar challenges in REDD implementation. Donor­led efforts 
to quickly »streamline« national legislation and enhance rule enforcement capacity under 
REDD readiness programmes are generally doomed to fail because they are unlikely to  
fundamentally change the incentives structures that promote deforestation and forest de­
gradation.
Rather than supporting another round of apparent forest sector reforms that do not change 
control over forest resources or forest revenues, donors should support in­depth studies of 
underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation. The results of such studies could, 
in combination with pilot REDD activities, serve as basis for a broad­based po licy dialogue. 
This will be time consuming but may ultimately result in more effective means of reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation.
policy conclusions
the southern-most one third of Ghana, which hosts the coun-
try’s remaining tropical high forest resources. The governance 
regime is highly centralised and all natural timber resources 
are under the authority of the national Forestry commission. 
official timber revenues are collected by the Forestry com-
mission, which, through a benefit sharing scheme, redistrib-
utes a (modest) share to the land owning local communities, 
the stools. 
results  
Causes of deforestation and forest degradation
in line with results of research elsewhere, we find that mul-
tiple factors underlie deforestation and forest degradation in 
Ghana, c.f. Table 1. some are within the forestry sector (e.g. 
low level of rule enforcement and low fees), while others 
relate to broader changes at the national (e.g. urbanisation, 
population growth) and international level (e.g. demand for 
cocoa, timber and minerals). REDD will be confined to for-
estry sector causes, because many of the other causes relate 
to complex social and economic patterns, nationally and 
internationally that, realistically, cannot be properly addressed 
under a national REDD programme. Thus, in Ghana REDD is 
essentially an issue of forest governance. 
These policy failures have persisted for decades; some in dire 
conflict with official policies and irrespective of various reform 
efforts. Why? our analysis suggests that they favour the 
political and administrative elite by securing political support 
and/or personal enrichment. They are not the result of lack of 
information, ignorance, or lack of capacity, notwithstanding 
that these factors implicitly underlie much of the REDD de-
bate. From the perspective of the political and administrative 
elite they are not policy failures, but arrangements that suc-
cessfully serve particular interests. our analysis, summarised 
in Figure 1, emphasises the political control over access to, 
and price of, standing timber through discretionary alloca-
tion of formal timber rights and low official forest fees. This 
creates rent-seeking opportunities for favoured timber firms, 
who come to owe their fortunes to the political and adminis-
trative elite. The windfall profits earned by the wood process-
ing sector provide a basis for political and financial kickbacks 
to those in charge of timber rights allocation and forest fee 
setting. yet, low forest fees result in minimum payoff to rural 
communities thus undermining their incentives to engage in 
conserving timber resources on their land. 
all formal timber rights are allocated to conventional timber 
firms, which are predominantly export oriented. production 
of lumber by chainsaw operators for the domestic market 
was criminalised by a ban in 1997, but has continued un-
abated. The ban is not enforced because denying urban citi-
zens’ access to lumber, while maintaining a sizeable export, 
would be politically suicidal. This policy has resulted in a tim-
ber harvest that is at least four times the sustainable level. 
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Governance reforms under REDD 
To be effective REDD readiness activities must focus on re-
forms that remove the political and administrative elite’s dis-
cretionary powers over timber rights allocation and resource 
pricing and enhance regulatory compliance. such reforms 
would run counter to national growth objectives since reduc-
ing the timber harvest would take away employment op-
portunities in the wood processing sector and reduce foreign 
exchange earnings. REDD payments could potentially soften 
such negative effects, but the uncertainty about how much 
money Ghana would actually get after a period of readiness 
is likely to make politicians reluctant to implement reforms 
during the readiness phase. moreover, reforms would also 
curb the political and personal benefits that members of the 
political and administrative elite derive from the resource. 
REDD payments are likely to come under close national and 
international scrutiny and is thus not necessarily an attractive 
alternative to the unofficial timber revenues that the political 
and administrative elite currently enjoys. although degraded, 
we suggest that Ghana’s timber resource is yet to reach 
the point where the political economy loses steam entirely, 
and where the negative impacts of deforestation and forest 
degradation are severely felt by the average Ghanaian, e.g. 
in the form of declining lumber supply or sharply increasing 
prices. This point reached, there will be mounting demands 
for reforms, and few reasons for policy-makers not to imple-
ment them; REDD in place or not. While realistic prospects of 
REDD payments may push forward in time the point where 
reforms are considered favourable, we argue that Ghana is 
yet to reach that point. a more likely scenario is preference 
for status quo, i.e. no or limited reforms, and negotiation of a 
favourable baseline that would generate REDD payments for 
what is essentially »hot air«.  
conclusions
The key features of the political timber economy in Ghana are 
centrally controlled, discretionary allocation of timber rights 
and administratively set forest fees, which in various ways 
leads to deforestation and forest degradation. many devel-
oping countries with tropical natural high forest share these 
basic features, which suggest that the Ghana case is not 
unique, and that other developing countries may face similar 
challenges in REDD implementation. 
methodologically, we emphasise the need for in-depth na-
tional level analysis of underlying causes of deforestation and 
Figure 1. The political timber economy in Ghana. Horisontal straight arrows signify the sequence of governance effects that lead 
to deforestation and forest degradation while curved arrows signify associated, unofficial cash flows.
class cause of deforestation and forest degradation
macro-economic factors international demand for cocoa, timber and minerals
 High per-capita growth rate
 corporate tax rebates and holidays to export firms
Demographic factors population growth
 urbanisation
Technological factors new low-shade cocoa varieties
 new mining technologies (surface mining)
 improved rotary veneering techniques
Forest governance factors low enforcement of harvesting rules
 low enforcement of rules protecting farmers’ rights
 low forest fees
 a biased timber rights allocation/ban on chainsaw 
 lumbering
 log export ban
 a biased benefit sharing arrangement
Table 1. Underlying causes of deforestation and forest  
degradation in Ghana’s High Forest Zone.
 
The forest and timber 
governance system is 
characterised by: 
• centralised allocation 
of timber rights. 
• low official fees. 
• log export ban. 
• Ban on chainsaw 
lumbering. 
• selective rule 
enforcement. 
export-oriented 
timber processing 
companies: 
• acquire most rights 
to standing timber. 
• Buy logs cheaply at 
the domestic log 
market.  
export oriented timber 
processing companies: 
• absorb almost all 
legally felled timber. 
• Have low efficiency 
rates. 
• Earn windfall profits. 
• can process more 
than the sustainable 
harvest. 
• over harvest their 
concessions. 
The domestic 
demand for 
timber is: 
• met by 
criminalised 
chainsaw 
lumber 
producers. 
people in forest fringe 
communities do not: 
• Receive many benefits from 
legally felled timber.  
• Grow timber trees on their 
farmland. 
• protect naturally occurring 
timber trees off-reserves. 
• prevent over-harvesting on-
reserves. 
• Enjoy much protection of the 
law. 
rent seeking opportunities 
exploited by: 
• political & administrative 
elite. 
• lower level law enforcing 
bureaucrats.  
• Deforestation  
• Forest 
degradation 
forest degradation including why these causes have emerged 
and whose interests they serve. Essentially, this means an 
analysis of the political economy of deforestation and forest 
degradation. We recommend that such analyses be carried 
out at the initial stage of national REDD programmes, e.g. 
those carried out under un-REDD or the World Bank’s Forest 
carbon partnership Facility. 
it follows from our analysis that we are sceptical as to how 
fast and easy it will be to implement REDD in a country like 
Ghana. This should, however, not be interpreted as an argu-
ment for doing nothing. What we warn against are reforms 
pushed and financed by donors with their usual eagerness 
to show quick results. such attempts are doomed to fail just 
like donor-driven attempts to reform forest fees, timber rights 
allocation and harvesting regulations. But there are other 
things that donors can do. Based on detailed studies of un-
derlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation, facil-
itation and support to a broad based policy debate, especially 
the participation and voice of segments of civil society (e.g. 
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nGos, advocacy groups, farmers’ associations) may assist in 
tipping the political balance in favour of reforms. This could 
be complemented by pilot activities to demonstrate and gain 
experiences on issues of relevance to the success of REDD. 
To learn more about the study please refer to c.p. Hansen,  
j.F. lund and T. Treue (2009).
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